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(57) ABSTRACT 
Embodiments of optical network evaluation systems and 
methods are disclosed. One system embodiment, among oth-
ers, comprises a processor configured with logic to provide a 
cross layer model of disturbance propagation in an optical 
network based on a combination of a physical layer model 
and a network layer model, the physical layer mode based on 
the disturbance propagation having a threshold effect only on 
nodes along a route followed by the disturbance. 
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OPTICAL NETWORK EVALUATION 
SYSTEMS AND METHODS 
STATEMENT REGARDING FEDERALLY 
SPONSORED RESEARCH OR DEVELOPMENT 
2 
For instance, signals of a first wavelength (e.g., A1) are pro-
vided on connections 24a and 28a, and signals of a second 
wavelength (e.g., A2 ) are provided on connections 26a and 
30a. As one exemplary mechanism of attack propagation, an 
attacker may gain legitimate access to a network node at 
connection 24a and insert a signal flow with strong signal 
power into the network. Due to the crosstalk effects of wave-
length switches, a small fraction of the signal from the attack 
channel (on connection 24a) may leak into other normal 
This invention was made with government support under 
agreement ECS-0300305 awarded by the National Science 
Foundation. The Government has certain rights in the inven-
tion. 
CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED 
APPLICATION 
10 
channels (e.g., connection 24b, the leak graphically repre-
sented with a dashed line) in a shared switching plane. The 
leakage superimposed onto normal channels may exceed a 
predetermined threshold for a quality of service requirement, 
such that those channels are considered to be affected by the 
attack at network nodes. In other words, AON s are susceptible 
This application is related to U.S. provisional patent appli-
cation entitled "Cross-Layer Graphical Models for Resilience 
of All Optical Networks Under Cross-Talk Attacks," filed on 
Jul. 26, 2005, and accorded Ser. No. 60/702,481, which is 
entirely incorporated herein by reference. 
15 to crosstalk attacks. 
As AONs grow in span and functionality, they have the 
potential to provide services to a wider set of applications in 
the future (e.g. analog services, novel applications that 
require optical interfaces, etc.). Therefore, there is an increas-
TECHNICAL FIELD 
The present disclosure is generally related to optical net-
works, and, more particularly, is related to systems and meth-
ods for evaluation of optical networks. 
20 ing demand for access oftheAONs from outside parties, such 
as limited management access to the network from partners 
and customers of service providers, which results in an 
increasing threat to optical network security. A wider set of 
users and an increasingly open platform of optical networks 
BACKGROUND 
25 entail a higher risk of misuse of the network, which is evi-
denced by the security threats such as denial-of-service 
attacks and worm attacks in the current Internet. 
There have been several research activities with an aim to 
mitigate the threats of crosstalk attacks in AONs, including All-optical networks (AONs) are considered a promising 
technology for next-generation optical networks. Major 
applications of AONs include metropolitan area networks 
(MANs) and wide area networks (WANs), but MANs and 
WANs are not 100% secure. For instance, AONs are suscep-
tible to malicious (or unintentional) disturbances (e.g., 
attacks or other faults that propagate in a network) since the 
signals remain in the optical domain within the network, and 
are hence difficult to monitor closely. Further, due in part to 
the high data rates supported by AONs, even disturbances of 
30 
attack detection based on node wrappers, determination of 
necessary and sufficient conditions for crosstalk attack local-
ization, and general frameworks for managing faults and 
alarms in AONs. However, these approaches are reactive in 
nature. Furthermore, certain crosstalk attacks are difficult to 
detect. For instance, sporadic crosstalk attacks may disrupt 
35 service but "disappear" before it can be detected. 
a short duration can result in a large amount of data loss. 
Hence, security of AONs upon disturbances has become an 40 
important issue, where an open question is how to incorporate 
security against disturbances in the design and engineering of 
AON architectures. Investigations ofthis question are impor-
tant as AON s are still at an early stage of implementation and 
ground-up developments of secure all-optical networks are 45 
possible. 
There have been some approaches to this question in the 
past in the context of crosstalk attacks in AON s. Crosstalk in 
AON scan be caused by signal leakage among different inputs 
at non-ideal network devices (e.g. optical switches), as illus- 50 
trated in FIG. 1. FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of an optical 
network node 10 that illustrates crosstalk attacks, and in par-
ticular a detrimental type of crosstalk often referred to as 
in-band crosstalk (e.g., where the crosstalk element is within 
the same wavelength as the signal). In-band crosstalk attacks 55 
can happen at fiber links or network nodes. The optical net-
work node 10 comprises optical fibers 12, 14 coupled to 
demultiplexers 16and18. The demultiplexers 16and18 may 
be used in cooperation with optical filters (not shown). The 
optical network node 10 further comprises optical switches 60 
20 and 22, which are coupled to demultiplexers 16, 18 by 
connections 24a, 26a, 28a, and 30a. The optical switches 20 
and 22 are also coupled to multiplexers 32 and 34, via con-
nections 24b, 26b, 28b, and 30b, where signals are combined, 
and then output via connections 36 and 38. The demultiplex- 65 
ers 16and18 split the optical signals received on connections 
12 and 14 into a plurality of bands of different wavelengths. 
SUMMARY 
Embodiments of the present disclosure provide system and 
methods for evaluating optical networks. 
One method embodiment, among others, comprises, for a 
physical model, modeling propagation of a disturbance in an 
optical network under static network conditions based on the 
disturbance propagation having a threshold effect only on 
nodes along a route followed by the disturbance; for a net-
work model, modeling a status of each network route in the 
optical network based on the disturbance; and combining the 
physical layer model and the network layer model to provide 
a cross layer model that characterizes the disturbance propa-
gation based on network layer and physical layer dependen-
cies and interactions in the optical network. 
One system embodiment, among others, comprises a pro-
cessor configured with logic to provide a cross layer model of 
disturbance propagation in an optical network based on a 
combination of a physical layer model and a network layer 
model. 
Other systems, methods, features, and advantages of the 
present disclosure will be or become apparent to one with 
skill in the art upon examination of the following drawings 
and detailed description. It is intended that all such additional 
systems, methods, features, and advantages be included 
within this description, be within the scope of the present 
disclosure, and be protected by the accompanying claims. 
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS 
Many aspects of the disclosure can be better understood 
with reference to the following drawings. The components in 
US 7,903,970 B2 
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the drawings are not necessarily to scale, emphasis instead 
being placed upon clearly illustrating the principles of the 
present disclosure. Moreover, in the drawings, like reference 
numerals designate corresponding parts throughout the sev-
eral views. 
FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram that illustrates exemplary 
crosstalk attack propagation in an optical network. 
FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram of an example implementa-
tion for certain embodiments of optical network evaluation 
systems and methods. 
FIG. 3 is a block diagram of an embodiment of the optical 
network evaluation system shown in FIG. 2. 
FIG. 4 is schematic diagram that illustrates an exemplary 
mesh network with a plurality of routes. 
4 
models attack propagation under static network traffic and a 
given source of attack with random attacking power. At the 
network layer, an undirected probabilistic graph is described 
that represents the probability distribution of active connec-
tions. The ON evaluation systems and methods generate these 
graphical representations of the physical and network layer 
models through the execution of the various formulas and 
methods described herein, and combines the physical- and the 
network-layer models together to form a cross-layer model 
10 that has a factor graph representation. 
FIG. 5 is a schematic diagram that illustrates a directed 15 
probabilistic graph representation of attack propagation for 
the mesh network shown in FIG. 4. 
The cross-layer model is developed using a bottom-up 
approach and provides an explicit representation of the com-
plex dependencies between the physical- and the network-
layer. Furthermore, the graphical models facilitate the analy-
sis of multiple factors from network architecture on network 
resilience. For regular topologies, bounds may be derived on 
FIG. 6 is a schematic diagram that illustrates an undirected 
probabilistic graph representation of network routes for the 
mesh network shown in FIG. 4. 
FIG. 7 is a schematic diagram that illustrates a factor graph 
representation of the mesh network shown in FIG. 4. 
FIGS. SA-SC are schematic diagrams that illustrate exem-
plary ring, double-ring, and mesh networks. 
the network resilience. For irregular and/or large topologies, 
the cross-layer model provides computationally efficient 
20 methods for studying the resilience where the analysis is not 
feasible. 
In the description that follows, an exemplary implementa-
FIG. 9 is a graph diagram that illustrates average network 25 
resilience loss versus network load for the three networks 
shown in FIGS. SA-SC. 
tion for certain embodiments of the ON evaluation systems 
and methods is provided, followed by a system embodiment. 
The remainder of the disclosure is organized to illustrate an 
attack propagation model under static traffic and a given 
source of attack based on a directed probabilistic graph, a 
network-layer representation using an undirected probabilis-
tic graph, and a cross-layer model based on a factor graph, and 
FIG. 10 is a graph diagram that illustrates an average net-
work resilience loss versus network load for a National Sci-
ence Foundation (NSF) benchmark network topology. 
FIG. 11 is a flow diagram that illustrates an embodiment of 
an optical network evaluation method. 
DETAILED DESCRIPTION 
Disclosed herein are various embodiments of optical net-
work (ON) evaluation systems and methods. In one embodi-
ment, an ON evaluation system comprises a computer system 
configured to receive parameters of a particular network and 
of a disturbance or attack, and responsively generate physical 
layer and network layer models that are combined to provide 
insight into disturbance propagation in the context of inter-
actions and dependencies between the physical and network 
layers of an optical network. Additionally, such an ON evalu-
ation system can be used to determine the resiliency of optical 
networks to such disturbances, and hence provides a mecha-
nism to address the resiliency of optical networks to deliber-
ate (e.g., attacks) or unintentional disturbances before such 
disturbances are detected and eliminated from the network. 
Certain embodiments of ON evaluation systems and meth-
ods are described below in the context of all optical networks 
(AONs), with the understanding that included within the 
scope of such networks are hybrid (electrical and optical) 
networks where evaluation is focused on the optical portions 
of the hybrid network. Additionally, the various embodiments 
30 using the cross-layer model to quantify network resilience 
upon crosstalk attacks. Further illustration of an application 
of the models to the evaluation of network resilience of dif-
ferent network topologies is provided. 
FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram that depicts a general pur-
35 pose computer 100 that serves as an example implementation 
for ON evaluation software, the latter represented with refer-
ence numeral 200. In one embodiment, the ON evaluation 
system comprises the computer 100. The general purpose 
computer 100 can be in a stand-alone configuration, or net-
40 worked among other computers. The general purpose com-
puter 100 includes a display terminal 102 that provides a 
display of, among other things, a representation of the various 
models generated by the ON evaluation software 200, such as 
the factor graph 700 shown in the display terminal 102. Other 
45 screens may be presented, such as network topologies, user 
interfaces for enabling user input of optical network param-
eters, etc. Although the factor graph 700 is shown on the 
display terminal 102, suggesting graphical representations of 
the various models generated by the ON evaluation software 
50 200, it should be understood by those having ordinary skill in 
the art that some embodiments of the ON evaluation system 
can be implemented in a marmer that is transparent, in whole 
or in part, to the user. For instance, the basis of the various 
models are in some embodiments equations executed by the 
55 ON evaluation software 200, and hence the results of such 
equation execution may be data that is delivered to other 
software or devices without the need for a graphical repre-
sentation. 
of the ON evaluation systems are described herein in the 
context of disturbances embodied as crosstalk, with the 
understanding that other disturbances, man-made, machine 
made, and/or inherent in the physical architecture of the par-
ticular network, also apply and hence are considered within 60 
the scope of the disclosure. 
The ON evaluation system can be implemented in software 
(e.g., firmware), hardware, or a combination of the same. In 
the embodiment shown in FIG. 2, the ON evaluation system 
is embodied as a computer 100 running an executable pro-
gram (e.g., ON evaluation software 200), and the program is 
executed by the general purpose computer 100 or other spe-
Thus, the disclosure that follows describes the application 
of probabilistic graphical models to characterize cross-layer 
attack propagation, including directed probabilistic graphs 
(e.g., Bayesian BeliefN etworks) and undirected probabilistic 65 
graphs (e.g., Markov Random Fields). In particular, at the 
physical layer, a directed probabilistic graph is described that 
cial or general purpose digital computer, such as a personal 
computer (PC; IBM-compatible, Apple-compatible, or oth-
erwise), workstation, minicomputer, or mainframe computer. 
US 7,903,970 B2 
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FIG. 3 is a block diagram showing a configuration of the 
general purpose computer 100 that can implement the ON 
evaluation software 200. Generally, in terms of hardware 
architecture, the computer 100 includes a processor 302, 
memory 304, and one or more input and/or output (I/O) 
devices 306 (or peripherals) that are communicatively 
coupled via a local interface 308. The local interface 308 can 
be, for example but not limited to, one or more buses or other 
wired or wireless connections, as is known in the art. The 
local interface 308 may have additional elements, which are 10 
omitted for simplicity, such as controllers, buffers (caches), 
drivers, repeaters, and receivers, to enable communications. 
Further, the local interface 308 may include address, control, 
and/or data connections to enable appropriate communica-
15 
tions among the aforementioned components. 
The processor 302 is a hardware device for executing soft-
ware, particularly that which is stored in memory 304. The 
processor 302 can be any custom made or commercially 
available processor, a central processing unit (CPU), an aux- 20 
iliary processor among several processors associated with the 
computer 100, a semiconductor-based microprocessor (in the 
form of a microchip or chip set), a macroprocessor, or gen-
erally any device for executing software instructions. 
The memory 304 can include any one or combination of 25 
volatile memory elements (e.g., random access memory 
(RAM, such as DRAM, SRAM, SD RAM, etc.)) and nonvola-
tile memory elements (e.g., ROM, hard drive, tape, CD ROM, 
etc.). Moreover, the memory 304 may incorporate electronic, 
magnetic, optical, and/or other types of storage media. Note 30 
that the memory 304 can have a distributed architecture, 
where various components are situated remote from one 
another, but can be accessed by the processor 302. 
The software in memory 304 may include one or more 
separate programs, each of which comprises an ordered list- 35 
ing of executable instructions for implementing logical func-
tions. In the example of FIG. 3, the software in the memory 
304 includes the ON evaluation software 200, optional net-
work topology software 310, and a suitable operating system 
(O/S) 312. Such software embodied in a computer readable 40 
medium such as memory 304 collectively comprises logic in 
some embodiments, though not limited to software stored in 
memory. The network topology software 310 may comprise 
topology analysis software that can determine the amount of 
nodes in a network and other operating parameters, and which 45 
can provide such network parameters to the ON evaluation 
software 200 for use in the computation of equations corre-
sponding to physical, network, and cross layer models. The 
operating system 312 essentially controls the execution of 
other computer programs, such as the ON evaluation software 50 
200 and the network topology software 310, and provides 
scheduling, input-output control, file and data management, 
memory management, and communication control and 
related services. 
The ON evaluation software 200 is a source program, 55 
executable program (object code), script, or any other entity 
comprising a set of instructions to be performed. The ON 
evaluation software 200 can be implemented, in one embodi-
ment, as a distributed network of modules, where one or more 
of the modules can be accessed by one or more applications or 60 
programs or components thereof. In some embodiments, the 
ON evaluation software 200 can be implemented as a single 
module with all of the functionality of the aforementioned 
modules. When a source program, the program is translated 
via a compiler, assembler, interpreter, or the like, which may 65 
or may not be included within the memory 304, so as to 
operate properly in connection with the O/S 312. 
6 
The I/O devices 306 may include input devices, for 
example but not limited to, a keyboard, mouse, scanner, 
microphone, etc. Furthermore, the I/O devices 306 may also 
include output devices, for example but not limited to, a 
printer, display, etc. Finally, the I/O devices 306 may further 
include devices that communicate both inputs and outputs, 
for instance but not limited to, a modulator/demodulator (mo-
dem for accessing another device, system, or network), a 
radio frequency (RF) or other transceiver, a telephonic inter-
face, a bridge, a router, etc. 
When the computer 100 is in operation, the processor 302 
is configured to execute software stored within the memory 
304, to communicate data to and from the memory 304, and to 
generally control operations of the computer 100 pursuant to 
the software. The ON evaluation software 200, the network 
topology software 310, and the O/S 312, in whole or in part, 
but typically the latter, are read by the processor 302, perhaps 
buffered within the processor 302, and then executed. 
When the ON evaluation software 200 is implemented in 
software, as is shown in FIG. 3, it should be noted that the ON 
evaluation software 200 can be stored on any computer read-
able medium for use by or in connection with any computer 
related system or method. The ON evaluation software 200 
can be embodied in any computer-readable medium for use 
by or in connection with an instruction execution system, 
apparatus, or device, such as a computer-based system, pro-
cessor-containing system, or other system that can fetch the 
instructions from the instruction execution system, apparatus, 
or device and execute the instructions. 
In an alternative embodiment, where functionality of the 
ON evaluation software 200 is implemented in hardware (the 
hardware providing the ON evaluation system functionality is 
also referred to herein as logic), such functionality can be 
implemented, in whole or in part, with any or a combination 
of the following technologies, which are each well known in 
the art: a discrete logic circuit(s) having logic gates for imple-
menting logic functions upon data signals, an application 
specific integrated circuit (ASIC) having appropriate combi-
national logic gates, a programmable gate array(s) (PGA), a 
field programmable gate array (FPGA), etc., or can be imple-
mented with other technologies now known or later devel-
oped. 
Having described certain embodiments of an ON evalua-
tion system, the following description in association with 
FIGS. 4-7 explain an underlying process employed by, and/or 
serving as a basis for, the ON evaluation software 200 to 
generate a physical layer model, a network layer model, and 
a cross-layer model based on the combination of the physical 
and network layer models. In some embodiments, function-
ality of the ON evaluation software 200 may be distributed 
among several modules locally or remotely located with 
respect to each other, wherein one module receives the physi-
cal and network layer models from another module(s) co-
located or remotely located (e.g., resident on one or more 
external devices), and wherein the one module responsively 
generates the cross-layer model (and respective graphical 
representation found in the factor graph 700). In particular, 
the description and accompanying drawings that follow gen-
erally focus on three, though not limited to three, components 
of network architectures against crosstalk attacks: (a) physi-
cal layer optical devices, (b) physical topology, and ( c) wave-
length usage at the network layer, which is determined by 
network layer traffic. 
One goal of the various methods described herein is to 
quantify the effects of these factors against crosstalk attacks, 
and hence characterize the interactions of at least these three 
factors of network architectures during crosstalk attack 
US 7,903,970 B2 
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propagation. For instance, attacks propagate to active wave-
length channels of the same wavelength as the attacker's flow. 
Reference herein to a channel refers to frequency band of one 
wavelength, although it should be understood in the context 
of this disclosure that multiple wavelength crosstalk attack 
(or other disturbance) propagation is considered to be within 
the scope of this disclosure. Meanwhile, wavelength usage at 
the network layer is dependent because of the sharing of 
network links among different connections. Therefore, the 
various models (whether represented graphically or in equa- 10 
tion form) provide an explicit representation of the cross-
layer interactions. 
Before proceeding with an explanation of FIGS. 4-7, a 
formulation of the problem of solving attack propagation is 
presented below. The topology of an AON is defined as an 15 
undirected graph G(V,E), with V being a set of nodes and E 
being a set ofbi-directional links. Denote V,-V)fthere is one 
bi-directional link between V, and V1, V,, V1EV. Let R be a 
finite set of routes in the network. Assume that there are no 
wavelength converters in the AON. A connection on router, 20 
rER, is defined as a bi-directional light-path on route r that 
consists of one unidirectional flow in each direction. Each 
bi-directional link described below consists of two optical 
fibers, one for each direction. Hence, reference to a "connec-
tion" hereinafter includes a reference to bi-directional traffic, 25 
and reference to "flows" refers to uni-directional traffic. Fur-
ther, an assumption is made that each wavelength can only be 
used by one active connection on the same network link. 
Additionally, single-source in-band crosstalk attacks are con-
sidered in the examples that follow. That is, a crosstalk attack 30 
is started at the source node of a unidirectional flow on wave-
length A, and propagates to flows that use the same wave-
length. As the disclosure that follows focuses on in-band 
crosstalk attacks, "flows", "connections", and "channels" are 
typically used hereinafter without explicit reference to their 35 
associations with wavelength A. 
Let S, be a random variable that denotes the number of 
active channels affected by the in-band crosstalk attack at the 
switching plane of node V,. Vector S=(S,: V, EV) corresponds 
to the number of affected channels at each node in the net- 40 
8 
Given that there is a crosstalk attack started on flow fsd' the 
network resilience loss can be defined as follows: 
Mf,d = ~ E1,d[S;], 
VjEV 
where E1,d[S;] = ~s;P(S; =s;IRJ = f,d) 
S; 
(1) 
is the expected number of affected channels at node V, given 
the source of the attack. M_r,d denotes the total number of active 
channels affected when the attack starts from a particular 
flow. 
Additionally, the average network resilience loss of the 
network can be defined as M=ERjM_r,), where ER)] stands 
for the expectation over the source of the attack Rfi i.e., 





with the assumption that each network route in R is equally 
likely to be an attacker's route, and the attack is started on one 
of the two unidirectional flows on the attacker's route with an 
equal probability. 
Given the above-described formulation of the problem, 
reference is now made to FIG. 1 to illustrate the nature of an 
exemplary source of a cross-talk attack and how such an 
attack can propagate through an optical network. The physi-
cal layer model is determined to model attack propagation 
under static network traffic and a given source of attack. For 
example, one exemplary mechanism involves in-band 
crosstalk attacks where an attacker gains legitimate access to 
the network and injects signals of high power into a flow. Due 
to imperfect switching arrays, the attacker's channel (e.g., on 
connection 24a) may affect other channels (e.g., on connec-
tion 24b) that share the switching plane (e.g., the plane that 
supports the actual switching fabric for the input signals, such 
work. Let Ni/ denote the status ofroute rif, where Ni/= 1 ifthere 
is an active connection on route rif between node V, and Vi' for 
ri/ER; Nif=O, otherwise. Vector N=(Ni/:ri/ER) then represents 
the status of all network routes in R. Let fsd be denoted as the 
flow starting from nodes and terminating at node d. Given this 
problem formulation, it is understood in the context of this 
disclosure that one goal is to obtain the following quantities to 
characterize attack propagation. 
(a) P(SIN=n, Rf=fsd): The probability of the number of 
channels affected at each network node given the status of 
network routes n and the source of attack Rfi where Rfdenotes 
the unidirectional flow where the attack originates. This prob-
ability represents attack propagation under a given n and fsd' 
and is to be characterized through a directed probabilistic 
graph. 
45 as switch 20 in FIG. 1), causing malfunctions at several loca-
tions in the network. As explained above, FIG. 1 depicts an 
example of in-band crosstalk attack. At each network node, 
channels of the same wavelength (e.g., on connections 24a, 
28a) from different input fibers 12 and 14 share the same 
(b) P(NIRf=fsd): The probability of the status of network 
routes given the source of attack, which is to be described 
using an undirected probabilistic graph. 
( c) P(S I Rf=fsd): The probability of the number of channels 
affected at each node given the source of attack, which mod-
els attack propagation under dynamic traffic. This probability 
combines the physical- and the network-layer models from 
(a) and (b ), and is described with a factor graph representa-
tion. 
The cross-layer model is then used to study network resil-
ience based on the resilience loss for a given attack flow and 
the average resilience loss over all possible attack flows. 
50 switching plane. Suppose that the crosstalk is initiated on 
flow Cl (on connections 24a) using wavelength A1 from input 
fiber 12. All the wavelength channels that share a switching 
plane with Cl (e.g., channel C2 on connection 28a from input 
55 
fiber 14) may be contaminated by Cl's power leakage. 
In particular, a network node, such as network node 10 of 
FIG. 1, is affected by the attack if the amount of in-band 
crosstalk incurred by normal channels (e.g., channels in the 
network that are not the attacker's channel) at the switching 
plane of that node exceeds a predetermined threshold. Each 
60 node along the attacker's route may be affected by the attack 
due to the high signal power of the attack flow, but the chance 
for nodes that are not on the attacker's route to be affected by 
the attack is negligible. That is, normal flows affected by the 
attack flow at one or more network nodes along the attacker's 
65 route do not have attacking capability, as its signal power is 
unlikely to be increased by more than half the normal channel 
power. For instance, considertheexampleinFIG.1. Suppose, 
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fier (EDF A) and an output EDF A at each side of a node (e.g., 
node 10 of FIG. 1), respectively. Note that in some embodi-
ments, the techniques described herein can be extended to the 
derivation of physical layer models using other amplifiers 
(e.g., Raman amplifiers, etc.). Furthermore, the following 
parameters can be defined: 
at one time instant, the attacker's jamming power is 20 dB 
higher than the normal channel power and the optical 
switches have a crosstalk ratio of -35 dB. Then the power of 
flow C2 is increased by around -15 dB of the normal channel 
power at node 10. The power of flow C2 at a second node (not 
shown) coupled to optical fiber 38, for instance, is in the same 
order as in node 10, whose crosstalk leakage to flow leaving 
the second node is negligible given the crosstalk ratio of -35 
dB. 
Currently, optical switches with crosstalk ratios much less 
than -35 dB are commercially available. Thus, in the models 
I, 1 : Signal loss ratio of node V, before the flow enters the 
switching plane, which mainly includes signal loss at a 
demultiplexer (e.g., demultiplexers 16 and 18, as shown in 
10 FIG. 1). 
of the present disclosure, the in-band crosstalk caused by 
normal flows is ignored, and it is assumed that only nodes 
along the attacker's route may be affected by the attack. Note 
that work prior to this disclosure on cross-talk attacks 15 
assumes that attacks may propagate to nodes that are not on 
the attacker's routes. Such a distinction from prior work ren-
ders the approach described in this disclosure less complex 
and more informative than prior approaches, as explained 
further below in association with FIG. 5. In addition, attacks 20 
propagate to all the active channels that share the switching 
plane with the attacker's channel at each affected node. Based 
on these assumptions, the probabilistic attack propagation 
model can be described in the following sections. 
A physical layer model is derived based on the following 25 
considerations. Consider a crosstalk attack started at node s 
on flow fsd· Let the set of nodes traversed by flow fsd be 
Y;;d ={V v V 2 , ... , V k}, where V 1 and V k are the source and the 
destination nodes respectively. The attack propagation is 
characterized by the status of each node in Y;;d and the status 30 
of wavelength channels at the switches of those nodes. 
The status of node V, can be defined as a binary variable X,. 
Specifically, let the signal power of a normal flow at the 
switching plane of each node be un when there is no attack in 
the network. Let the crosstalk ratio of the switches in the 35 
I, 2 : Signal loss ratio of node V, after the flow enters the 
switching plane, which mainly includes loss at the switching 
plane and a multiplexer (e.g., multiplexers 32 and 34). 
a,,/ Signal loss ratio of the fiber span between node V, and 
nodeV1. 
g,_1 ( ): The gain of the EDFA at the input side of node V,. 
g,_2 ( ): The gain of the EDFA atthe output side of node V,. 
For a given network, l,_ 1 , l,_2 , a,J are constants; g,_ 1 ()and 
g, 2 ( ) are deterministic non-linear functions of the input 
p~wer to the amplifiers (e.g., EDFAs). 
Additionally, the following gain model for EDFAs can be 
adopted: 
{ 
d· · if Pinput s Pth, 
gij(P;nput) = l'J' Pwt l go 
+ -- og---, otherwise, 
Pinput gu(Pinput) 
(4) 
where P,nput is the total input power; Psat is the internal satu-
ration power; g0 is the small signal saturated gain; Pth is the 
input power threshold for successful gain clamping, and di/ is 
the clamped gain value. 
Assume thatthe attacker's flow (fsd) does not share EDF As 
with other flows. This corresponds to a conservative model of 
the jamming power attenuation and a worst-case scenario of 
in-band attack propagation, as all the photons of the EDF As 
network be le and let c,h be a predetermined constant. Then 
X,=1 ifthe amount of in-band crosstalk incurred by a normal 
channel at the switching plane of node V, exceeds c,hun; X,=O, 
otherwise. Furthermore, node V, is affected by the attack if 
X,=1. 40 are used to amplify the attacker's signal. Then, 
The use of binary nodal states facilitates the investigation 
of crosstalk attack propagation with random attacking power 
at the source. To be specific, the amount of in-band crosstalk 
at each node under attack may have a wide range of values. 
But the binary status of crosstalk levels at a node is simple and 45 
often observable. In fact, a frequent scenario for attack detec-
tion and monitoring is whether a predetermined threshold or 
service guarantee is violated at each node. When the amount 
(5) 
where n,J=P,nputg,)P,nput) is the output power of the EDFA 
with gain gif(P,nput) and input power P,npur Then, composite 
function i:1_1/t1_2 ,1_ 1 ( ... i:,J+l (.)))captures the attenuation of 
the jamming power between node V, and VJ" 
of crosstalk is below the threshold, the node is "up", i.e., 
operational; otherwise, the node is "down", i.e., affected. 
Hence the attacker's jamming power is treated as a random 
variable that obeys a certain probability distribution. The 
status of network nodes under crosstalk attacks then becomes 
(i.e., is represented as) binary random variables. The random-
ness lies in the fact that the crosstalk level is random due to the 
random jannning power of the attack. If the attacker's jam-
ming power has a higher probability of being large, it is more 
likely for the attack to propagate farther away from the source 
node. 
Further, assume that, when there is no crosstalk attack in 
the network, amplifiers on each fiber operate in the gain 
clamped regions and make up the signal attenuation between 
50 two nodes. Furthermore, assume that the attacker's jannning 
power at the source node of the attack follows a cumulative 
distribution function ri(U) with minimum power umim 
umin~c,hu)lc, and maximum power umax· Then, it can be 
shown that the status of each node along the attacker's route, 
55 X,, i=l, 2, ... , k, form a Markov Chain. Specifically, 
To determine the status of each node under attack, consider 60 
the attenuation of the jamming power of flow fsd along its 
route. The signal power of flow fsd in the switching plane of 
node V, is denoted as a random variable U,, i=l, 2, ... k. The 
attenuation of the jannning power of fsd along its route can be 
captured using deterministic composite functions that depend 65 
on the characteristics of optical devices. Additionally, it is 
assumed that there exists an input erbium-doped fiber ampli-
P(X1=1) = 1. 
P(X;+ilX1, X2, ... , X;) = P(X;+ilX;), i = 1, 2, ... , k -1. 
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where 111 ,, l~i~k-1, corresponds to the minimum value of 
jamming' power at node V 1 such that attack can propagate to 
node V,, and satisfies, 
(10) 
The derivation of (7) to (9) can be explained as follows: 
Let U, denote the jamming powerof the attack flow at node V,, 
VV,EV.r,d· It can be shown that ifU,~U,+1 for l~i<k, then 
PCX,+1IX1, X2 ... 'X,)=P(X,+1IX,). Suppose u,~U,+1· Since 
X,=1, if V,>c,h/(lcun); and X,=O, otherwise. It follows that 10 
P(X1 =xv X2=x2, ... , X,=x,),.O, only ifx1 ~x2~ ... ~x,. Let 
k1=max{j:x1=1 & l~j~i}, which is thelargestindexofnodes 
affected by the attack among V 1, V 2, ... , V,. Then, 
(a) Ifl~k1 <i, X1=l, ... Xk1=l, Xk11 =0, ... , X,=O. Therefore 
15 
12 
It follows that U,~U,+1 . To prove (9) above, it suffices to 
show that i:,,,+l (U,) monotonically increases in U,, where 
Since l,+1 1, a, i+1' and 1, 2 are constants, to show that i:, i+l 
(U,) monoto~icaily increa~es in U,, it suffices to show that' Jti/ 
(P,nput) monotonically increase in P,npur This can be obtained 
by showing 
This means that the higher the input power at EDFA, the 
{ 
X1 = 1, ... , X, 1 = 1, l 
x,
1 
+1 = o, ... , x, = o, 
(llJ higher the output power when the EDFA works at either the 
saturated or the non-saturated region. 
J X;+1 = o I ~1 = 1,. .. x~1 = 1,) = _ X;+i = o _ 
'l X,1+1-0, ... ,X,-O JX1-~ ... ,X,1 --l,) 
'l x,1 +1 - o, ... , x, _ o 
The conditional probabilities in (9) can take different forms 
20 depending on ri(U). For simplicity, the following can be 
denoted: 
= P(X,1 = 1, X,1+1=OJ=1. 
P(X,1 = 1, X,1+1 =OJ 
25 
Since P(X,_1=01X,=0)=1, the following is observed: 
P(X,_1 IX1X2 ... , X;)~P(X,.1 IX;). 
(b) Ifl~k1=i, X1=l, ... , X1=1. Therefore, 
P(X;+1 = llX; = lJ =a;, 
l -17(61,;+1J 
where a; = 1 _17(6i.;J , 
where 01,,, l~i<k, as in (10) above. 
(12J 
(16J 
P(U1 > Cth /(/,unJ, ... , U; > Cth /(/,unJJ 
P(U; > C1h/(/,unJ, U;+1 < C1h/(/,unJJ 
P(U; > c,h/(l,unJJ 
P(X; = 1, X;+1 =OJ 
P(X; = lJ 
= P(X;+1 = OIX; = lJ. 
Next, it can be shown that U,~U,_v assuming that, when 45 
there is no crosstalk attack in the network, amplifiers on each 
fiber operate in the gain clamped regions and make up the 
signal attenuation between the two nodes. From (5) above, the 
following is observed. 
50 
and 
Ifit is further assumed that the attacker's jamming power at 
the source node of the attack is uniformly distributed in [ umin' 
umaxL (9) can be rewritten as follows: 
max{O, Umax -max{umin• c51 i+1}} 
P(X;+1 = llX; = lJ = Um= -max{um;n, 61,;). . 
(17J 
Hereinafter in this disclosure, it is assumed that a,'s are 
(13) 55 known. 
where cl, 2 denotes the clamped gain of EDFA at the output 
side ofn~de V,; d,+11 denotes the clamped gain ofEDFA at 
the input side of node vi+l. Then, 
(14) 
(15) 
which corresponds to the case where the EDFA with subscript 
60 
(i,2) works at the saturation region. Therefore, 65 
The number of active channels affected by the attack at the 
switching plane of node V, is considered. Let Rif be the set of 
network routes that use link ij. Under static traffic, 
corresponds to the number of flows that enter the switching 
plane of node V, through link ij; 
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k-1 k n P(X;+ilX;, Rf= hd)n P(S;IX;, N = n, Rf= f,J), 
i=l 1=1 
corresponds to the number of flows that are locally originated 
from node V, and enter the network through link ij. Hence, 
under static network traffic, the total number of affected chan-
nels at the switching plane of V,, V,E:V;;d' is given by the 10 
following equation: 
where S;;d=(S,:V, EV;;), X;;d=(X,:V,EV;;), which is the status 
of nodes in the attacker's route, and k is the number of node 
in V;;d· Therefore, under static network traffic (given N=n), 
(X,,S,:V,EV;;) forms a directed probabilistic graph (Baye-
sian Belief Network). Each node in the probabilistic graph 
represents either X, or S,. There is one directed edge from X, P(S; =s; IX; =x;, N =n, Rf =f,d) = (18) 
1
1, ifs;= I { ~ nu,+ ~ n;h} and X; = 1, 
Vj~Vj ruvERij rihERij 
1 if S; = 1 and X; = 0, 
0, otherwise. 
Equation (18) provides that, when node V, is affected by 
the attack, all the active channels at the switching plane ofV, 
are affected by the attack; otherwise, if node V, is not affected 
by the crosstalk attack, only one channel (e.g., only the chan-
nel used by flow fsd itself) is affected by the attack at the node. 
That is, equation (18) describes a probability distribution of 
the number of channels affected by the attack given the fol-
lowing parameters: (a) the status of node X,; (b) the status of 
each network route in the network, n; and ( c) the source of the 
attack flow fsd· In equation (18), 
15 
to X,+1 and one directed edge from X, to S, respectively. Note 
that, given N=n and X,=x,, S, is deterministic, but S, is 
included for an explicit graphical representation of attack 
propagation. Note that equation (18) provides a detailed form 
of a conditional probability in equation (19), and equations 
20 (6) through (9), (16) and (17) correspond to a derivation of a 
second conditional probability in equation (19). 
Having described the derivation of a physical layer model, 
reference is now made to FIG. 4. FIG. 4 is a schematic 
diagram that illustrates an exemplary mesh network 400 with 
25 a plurality of routes (e.g., eleven routes). That is, the exem-
plary mesh network 400 comprises a plurality of nodes 402 
(seven nodes 402 are shown labeled A, B, C, D, E, F, and G) 
and a plurality of routes 404 (eleven routes, where all the 
routes in R are marked in dashed lines). Suppose that the 
30 crosstalk attack is started on flow BD 406. Reference herein to 
an attacker's route (or disturbance route) refers to the route 
traversed between an attacker's flow. For instance, with ref-
erence to FIG. 4, ifthe attacker's flow is f6 d, then the attack-
er's route is the route from node B to node D, which passes 
35 through links BC and CD. In certain embodiments, a node is 
considered as affected by an attack ifthe amount of in-band 
crosstalk incurred by normal channels from that particular 
node exceeds a predetermined threshold. Branches off the 
corresponds to the number of flows that enter the switching 40 
plane of node V, through link ij; 
route BD (e.g., the branch from node B to node F) are not part 
of the attacker's route. As explained above, in prior work, 
nodes that are not part of the attacker's route are assumed to 
corresponds to the number of flows that are locally originated 
from node V, and enter the network through link ij. Therefore, 
corresponds to the total number of active wavelength chan-
nels in the switching plane of node V,. Hence, equation (18) 
describes that when node V, is affected by the attack, all the 
active channels at the switching plane ofV, are affected by the 
attack; otherwise, if node V, is not affected by the crosstalk 
attack, only one (e.g., only the channel used flow fsd itself), is 
affected by the attack at the node. 
Combining equations (16) and (18) results in a physical-
layer attack propagation model, expressed by the following 
equation: 
be affected by the attack, in contrast to the various embodi-
ments described herein, as further described below in con-
junction with FIG. 5. The directed probabilistic graph repre-
45 sentation 500 of attack propagation is shown in FIG. 5. 
Referring to the directed graph representation 500 of FIG. 
5 and the mesh network 400 of FIG. 4, a disturbance may 
propagate from node B to node C, then further from node C to 
node D, as evidenced by the directional edge from node B to 
50 node C and from C to D. Whether a node is affected by the 
attack or not is denoted by the variables Xi, where i in this 
example equals B, C, and D. Meanwhile, the number of 
affected channels at each node can be found from variable(s) 
S. Under static network traffic, the number of affected chan-
55 nels at each node is determined by the status of that node, 
which is indicated by directed edges from variable Xi to 
variable Si, where i equals B, C, and D. 
Several differences are noted between the directed graph 
500 of FIG. 5 and previous work on cross-talk attack models. 
60 For instance, in the March 2005 publication authored by the 
inventors of the current disclosure and entitled, "Probabilistic 
Graphical Models for Resilience of All-Optical Networks 
under Crosstalk Attacks," it is assumed that attack propaga-
tion includes nodes not located on the attacker's route, as 
65 explained above. Such assumptions at the time of that publi-
cation were based in part on the relative infancy in the field of 
security in optical networks and less advanced optical tech-
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The physical layer model described by Equation (19) char-
acterizes attack propagation under static network traffic. 
Under dynamic traffic, however, the status of each network 
route Nsd' rsE=R, is random and can be characterized using a 
nologies related to optical switches and crosstalk ratios. 
Under such prior assumptions and referring to FIG. 5, addi-
tional directed edges would be shown from XB to neighboring 
nodes that can be affected by the attack, for instance an XA 
located in FIG. 5 to the left ofXB or an XF located below XA, 
or similarly to a neighboring node below or beyond Xn. In 
contrast, and referring to FIG. 5, the physical layer model 
involves the status of nodes only on the attacker's route. 
5 network layer model. To obtain the network layer model, 
P(NIRf=fsd) is to be obtained, which is the probability distri-
bution of route status given the source of the attack. From (3) 
above, the following equation is provided: 
Referring to FIG. 5, and drawing further distinctions 
between the disclosure and the March 2005 publication, XB 10 
represents whether node B is affected by the attack or not. SB 
represents the number of affected channels in the switching 
plane of node B. To contrast with prior work in this field, 
assume the SB is replaced with an XF" According to the March 
2005 publication authored by the inventors and referenced 15 
above, a directed edge from XB to XF represents the condi-
tional probability of node F (which is not along an attacker's 
route) being affected by the attack given the status of node B. 
That is, in the March 2005 publication, consideration is given 
P(NIR_rf,d)~P(NIN,,rl). (20) 
Then it suffices to find P(N), which can be characterized by an 
undirected probabilistic graph. 
An undirected probabilistic graph can be represented as 
G=(V, E), where V represents a set of vertices, and E repre-
sents a set of edges. Each node V,EV represents a random 
variable. A subset of nodes V c is said to separate two other 
subsets of nodes VA and VB if every path joining every pair of 
nodes V,EV A and V1EV B has at least one node from V c· An 
undirected probabilistic graph implies a set of conditional 
independence relations. That is, for any disjoint subsets of 
nodes in the undirected graph, VA' VB' and V 0 ifV c separates 
VA and VB' then VA and VB are conditional independent given 
V c- A node is separated from other nodes in the undirected 
graph by all its neighbors. 
of an attack that propagates from node B to node F. In con- 20 
trast, the directed edge from node XB to node SB represents the 
conditional probability of the number of affected channels in 
the switching plane of node B given the status of node B. The 
current physical layer model considers the damage caused by 
the attack at a particular node given its status. 25 A clique denotes a subset ofV that contains either a single 
node or several nodes that are all neighbors of one another. 
Then the joint probability distribution of V has a product 
form, as shown below: 
Additionally, the March 2005 publication fails to teach or 
suggest how to determine the probability of attack (e.g., prob-
ability that an attack propagates from node B to C and from C 
to D, etc.). That is, one skilled in the art is not able to derive the 
parameters of the models based on the March 2005 disclo- 30 
sure. Further, and as explained above, previous approaches 
lack the directed edge pertaining to the variable S, and hence 
fail to provide a graphical representation of attack propaga-
tion (e.g., the status of each node along an attacker's route). 
Note that in context of modeling AON signal transmis- 35 
sions, the physical-layer model described above is developed 
with the following assumptions: (1) the in-band crosstalk due 
to channels with normal signal power and/or nonlinear effects 
is ignored; (2) under normal operations, the EDF As work at a 
gain-clamped region and make up for the signal losses 40 
between two network nodes; (3) the optical switches have the 
same crosstalk ratio and threshold of crosstalk leakage for the 
definition of node affection. Note that reference to node affec-
tion or the like refers to a node being "affected" by the attack. 
For instance, a node is affected by an attack ifthe amount of 45 
in-band crosstalk incurred by normal channels at the switch-
ing plane of that node exceeds a predetermined threshold for 
quality of service requirement. Assumption (1) is reasonable 
because of the low crosstalk ratio of current optical switches. 
P(V) =Z-1n l/tq({V;:V; E Vq)), 
qEC 
where Z is the normalizing constant, 
Z= ~ n l/tq({V;:V; E Vq)); l/tq 
V qEC 
(21) 
is a non-negative function defined for clique VqEC, and C 
denotes the set of all the cliques in the graph G. 
The network-layer model is formed as follows. Each vertex 
in the undirected probabilistic graph represents the status of a 
route Ni/, rifER. Furthermore, the status of all network routes 
that share the same link forms a clique. It has been shown that 
the steady state distribution of the number of calls in loss 
networks without control form a Markov Random Field 
(MRF), which is one type of undirected probabilistic graph. 
The MRF representation can be generalized to an undirected 
probabilistic graph representation that includes explicitly the 
dependence among different routes due to the capacity con-
straint and the network load. 
For the exemplary mesh network 400 shown in FIG. 4, the 
corresponding network-layer model 600 is shown in FIG. 6. 
Referring to FIGS. 4 and 6, consider route AC 408, which 
traverses two network links: AB and BC. Meanwhile, link AB 
is in route AB 410 and route AF 412; link BC is in route BC 
414 and route BD 406. Since wavelength A can only be used 
If assumption (2) is relaxed (e.g., does not hold) so that the 50 
EDFAs work at gain-clamped region under normal opera-
tions, but may make up for more than the signal losses 
between two network nodes, then the status of nodes along the 
attacker's route may still form a Markov Chain. However, the 
order of nodes in the Markov Chain does not necessarily 55 
follow the sequence of Xv X2 , ... , Xk. The same is true, if 
assumption (3) is relaxed so that optical switches in the net-
work have different crosstalk ratios or the thresholds of 
crosstalk leakage for the definition of node affection are het-
erogeneous for different nodes. 
Another approach to model the attack propagation is to 
define a random variable that corresponds to the position of 
the last affected node along the attacker's route. This model is 
equivalent to the Markov Chain model in (6) to (16), but does 
not include explicitly the status of each node. Thus, such a 65 
model does not visually signify the actual attack propagation 
along the attacker's route. 
60 by one connection on each network link, route AC 408 has a 
contention of wavelength usage with routes AB 410, AF 412, 
BC 414, and BD 406. However, once the status of routes AB 
410,AF 412, BC414 andBD406isknown, the status ofroute 
AC 408 can be determined without violating the capacity 
constraints. Hence, routes AB 410, AF 412, BC 414 and BD 
406 are neighbors of route AC 408 and separate route AC 
from routes in the rest of the network, as shown in FIG. 6. 
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Therefore, by defining routes that share the same network 
link as neighbors, the capacity constraint in the undirected 
probabilistic graph is captured. The probability distribution 
of all network routes can be obtained by specifying proper 
clique potentials based on (21). The clique potentials are 5 
selected to characterize both the dependencies among differ-
ent network routes and the varying network load. 
In the discussion of physical layer models above, Rif is 
denoted as a subset of routes in R that traverse link ij. A clique, 
denoted as Ci/, can then be formed with all the routes in Ri/. 10 
Then the potential function of Cif, denoted as 1jJ if' is obtained 
as follows: (1) 1.j!if"'O if and only if the capacity constraint is 
satisfied (e.g., at most one route in Ri/ is active); (2) ifthe 
wavelength is used on link ij, then 1.j!if=yif; otherwise, 1.jli/=1-
y,1, O<yi/<l. From (21), the joint probability of all routes 15 




Nuv =Wu and 
Wu E {O, l}; and 
Ii( ~ Nu,)= 0, otherwise. 
ruvERij 
The network load (e.g., the probability that wavelength A is 
used in the network) is characterized by parameter, yi/·yi/ can 
be considered as a "weight" for using a wavelength at link ij; 
1-yi/ can be considered as a "weight" for not using a wave-
length at link ij. When yi/=y, VV,-V1, y can be related to the 
network load as follows: 
20 Proposition 1: Let p denote the network load, 
Ii( ~ Nu,)= 0, otherwise. 
ruvERij 
25 
The clique functions are non-zero if and only if 
11 C~r ER NuJ= 1. Thus (22) characterizes the dependencies 30 
of r6'iite~ that result from the capacity constraints. For 
instance, the potential function for the clique that corresponds 
to the routes using link AB, i.e., route NAB' NAF' and NAo is 
'liJ AB=YAB (NAB+NAF+NAC)(l -YAB) 1-(NAB+NAF+NAC)l 1 (NAB+ 
NAptNAc). (23) 
Note that (NAB+ N AF+ N Ac) corresponds to the total numberof 
active connections using wavelength A at link AB. As each 
wavelength can be used by at most one active connection, 
(NAB+NAF+NAc)=O or 1. Thus, 
{ 
1 if NAB +NAF +NAc = 0 or 1, 
fi(NAs+NAp+NAc)= . 
0 otherwise. 
where YAB can be considered as the weight of using wave-
length A at link AB. The potential function is YAB if wave-




used at link AB. 50 
The above network layer model equation (22) represents an 
advancement over the network layer model described in pre-
vious work by the inventors, namely the March 2005 publi-
cation, "Probabilistic Graphical Models for Resilience ofAll-
Optical Networks under Crosstalk Attacks." For instance, the 55 
network layer model described herein only involves the status 
of each route (represented by parameter, N), which is a simple 
and straightforward formulation for the network layer model. 
In contrast, the network layer model in the March 2005 pub-
lication additionally involves the status of each link (repre- 60 
sented by the parameter, W), as follows: 
If in (22), yi/=y, VV,-Vi' then p monotonically increases in y. 
A detailed proof of Proposition 1 can be explained as follows: 
To prove Proposition 1, it suffices to show that 
ap 
ay' v o < y < 1. 
From (22), assume yi/=y, then, 
P(N) = (24) 
Let 
Wu= ~ Nu, and W = (W;/V;-V1). 
ruvERij 
Wis a vector that represents the wavelength usage at each link 
in the network. A configuration of (N, W) with non-zero 
probability is denoted as a traffic pattern, i.e., a traffic pattern 
(N, W) satisfies the capacity constraints and P(N=n, W=w)> 
0. Let Tk, k=O, 1, ... , IEI, be the set of traffic patterns that k 
65 links in the network are used by active connections, with IEI 
being the number oflinks in E. Let IT kl denote the cardinality 
ofTk, then, 
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Using Cauchy-Schwartz Inequality, it can be shown that 
(25) 
(26) 
0(~(8))/08>0, 'ef8>0. (27) 
Since 38/Cly>O, 'v'O<y<l, the following is obtained: 
op/oy>o, VO<y<l. (28) 
Therefore, p increases monotonically in y. 
Referring to Proposition 1, (a) if y=0.5, the undirected 
probabilistic graph represents a uniform probability distribu-
tion on all possible ways of using wavelength A without 
violating the capacity constraint; (b) If y~ 1, p increases 
toward the maximum value, which is determined by both the 
network topology and the route set R; and ( c) If y~o, p 
approaches 0. For simplicity of analysis, it is assumed that 
yiJ=y, 'v'V,-V1, in the rest of the disclosure. From (22), it 
follows that 
P(NIR_rf,d)cxn,dP(NW,d,N,d~l). (29) 
Having described the derivation of the physical and net-
work layer models above, the cross-layer model of attack 
propagation can be obtained by combining the physical- and 
the network-layer model using a factor graph, which corre-
sponds to the following joint probability: 
20 
propagate from node V, to V,+u V,, V,+1 EV_r,d' X, and X,+1 are 
connected to the same factor node P(X,+1 1X,,Rf=fBD) 710. 
Furthermore, the number of affected channels at node V, is 
determined by X, and routes that traverses node V,. Therefore, 
5 S,, X,, and those routes passing through node V, are connected 
to the factor node 708 that describes the conditional probabil-
ity in (18). 
The upper portion 704 of the factor graph 700 characterizes 
the dependence at the network layer. All the network routes 
10 that share a common network link ij are connected to the 
clique function 1.jliJin (22). Here, the factor graph 700 provides 
an explicit representation of the dependencies among differ-
ent network components during attack propagation. Addi-
tional features of interest in the factor graph 700 include the 
15 clique function for link AB 706. 
Explaining FIG. 7 further, the graph 700 provides a cross-
layer view of disturbance propagation in the network. The 
lower portion 702 of the graph 700 corresponds to the distur-
bance propagation at the physical layer corresponding to FIG. 
20 5. As explained above, ifthe disturbance started on flow BD, 
it may propagate from node B to node C, and from node C to 
node D. Whether the node is affected by the attack or not is 
denoted by the variables Xi (i=B, C, and D). Further, how 
likely the attack may propagate to the next node depends on 
25 the functional nodes between two adjacent nodes (e.g., com-
ponent 710 in FIG. 7 determines how likely the disturbance 
may propagate from node B to node C). 
The upper portion 704 of the graph 700 corresponds to the 
network layer model corresponding to FIG. 6, which shows 
30 how different routes in the network are dependent. All the 
network routes that share a same network link are connected 
to the same functional node. For instance, route AF, AB, AC 
all traverse link AB, thus the variables that denote the status of 
these three routes are connected to the same function node 
35 706. 
Given the status of each network node and the status of 
each route that passes the particular node, the number of 
affected channels can be decided. For example, node B is 
passed through by route BF, AF, AB, AC, and BC. Therefore, 
40 the variables denoting the status of these routes are connected 
to the same functional node 708 with variables XB and SB. 
Thus, the cross-layer model provides an efficient visualiza-
tion for disturbance propagation in the network, characteriz-
P(Xhd'Sh<iNIR1~J,d)~P(ShJ,XJ;)N,R1~J,d)P(NIR1~J,d), (30) 45 
ing the disturbance propagation based on the network layer 
and the physical layer dependencies and interactions in the 
optical network. where X_r,d=(X,:V,EV_r,) and S_r,d=(S,:V,EV_r,J That is, equa-
tion (30), describes a cross-layer model according to one 
embodiment. In equation (30), P(S_r,d,X_r,)N,Rf=fsd) corre-
sponds to the physical layer model, which characterizes the 
probability distribution of the status and the number of 50 
affected channels at each node on the attacker's route given 
the status of each route and the source of attack. Additionally, 
P(NI Rf=fsd) in equation (30) corresponds to the network layer 
model, which characterizes the probability distribution of the 
status of each network route given the source of attack. 55 
A factor graph generally refers to a bipartite graph showing 
how a global function can be factorized into a product oflocal 
functions. Each local function depends on a subset of the 
variables. There are two types of nodes in a factor graph: a 
variable node for each variable, and a factor node for each 60 
local function. There is an edge connecting a variable node to 
a factor node if and only if the variable is an argument of the 
local function. 
FIG. 7 shows the factor graph representation 700 for the 
mesh network in FIG. 4 when the attack is started from flow 65 
BD. The lower portion 702 of the factor graph 700 represents 
attack propagation at the physical layer. As the attack may 
Factor graphs subsume directed and undirected probabilis-
tic graphical models, and provide explicit representations of 
the factorization of probability distributions. The application 
of factor graphs provides at least two advantages: (1) it shows 
the intricate dependencies among different network compo-
nents during a crosstalk attack; and (2) it provides computa-
tionally efficient algorithms to evaluate the network resil-
ience loss, as described further below. 
The cross-layer model can be used to study network resil-
ience. The following description provides an explanation of 
resilience in the context of the physical layer and quantifies 
how the resilience varies with physical topology as well as the 
physical layer vulnerabilities, the latter characterized by a, in 
(16). Consider the impact of physical-layer vulnerabilities by 
considering the lower and upper bounds of network resilience 
loss M_r,d· The lower bound of M_r,d results from the best-case 
scenario of resilience upon attack: there are no active connec-
tions on wavelength A that traverse link ij, 'v'V,EV_r,d' Y/$.Y_r,d' 
V,-V1. In this case, at the switching plane of each node along 
the attacker's route, only two channels are active that corre-
spond to the connection on the attacker's route. The upper 
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bound results from the worst-case scenario of network resil-
ience upon attack: there always exists an active connection 
inserted into the network at node V, and traverses link ij, 
VV,EV.r,d' V/f:-V.r,d' V,-V1. In this case, the number of active 
channels in the switching plane of node V, is 2( d,-1) or 2d,, 
VV,EV.r,d' where d, is the nodal degree ofV,. 
For simplicity, assume a,=a, VV,EV.r,d· Then, the network 
resilience loss for a given source of attack fsd can be bounded 
according to Proposition 2 as follows: 
k k 
k + 2= aJ-l s M1,d s k + 2(1 + a:'-
1) + 2= (2d; - 3)aJ-1, 
(31) 
i=l i=l 
where k is the total number of nodes in VJ;J' k> 1. The lower 
bound in (31) characterizes the effect of route-length and a on 
attack propagation, which increases polynomially with 
respect to a. Furthermore, 
~ 1 {k+l+a:+o(a:), k + L..J a/- = 
;~l 2k - O.Sk(k - 1)(1 - a:)+ o(l - a:), as a:--+ 1, 
(32) 
which shows that M.r,d is determined by the length of route rsd· 
The upper bound in (31) increases approximately linearly 
with a, where 
k+2(l+a:'-1)+ 
k 
2= (2d; - 3)d-1 
i=l 
k + 2d1 - 1 + (2d2 - 3)a: + o(a:), 




(1-a:) +o(l -a:) 
which shows that, when there is an active connection inserted 
into the network at node V, using link ij, VV,EVJ;J' Y/f:_VJ;J' 
V,-Vi' if the network vulnerability is low, M.r,d is determined 
22 
asymptotic results on M.r,d in (32) and (33) for network resil-
ience under various topologies are summarized below in 
Table I. Assume that there is one link-shortest route between 
each pair of nodes in the network. The asymptotic properties 
of these topologies are summarized in Table II. Combining 
the impacts of physical-layer vulnerability and physical 
topology, the following observations can be made: 
(1) If the physical-layer vulnerability is high (a~ 1), 
10 (i) The upper bound ofM.r,d shows that fully-connected mesh 
networks and star networks are the least resilient due to the 
large size of the set E.r,d· 
(ii) The lower bound of M.r,d shows that networks with a ring 
15 topology are generally the least resilient because of the large 
route length in a ring network. 
(2) If the physical-layer vulnerability is low ( a~O), 
(i) The upper bound of M.r,d shows that the fully-connected 
20 mesh topology is the least resilient since each node in the 
network has nodal degree m-1. 
25 
(ii) The lower bound of M.r,d shows that the ring network is 
generally the least resilient due to the large route length. 
(3) Chord networks exhibit good resilience whose resil-
ience loss M.r,d increases logarithmically with respect to the 
number of nodes in the network in the worst case. 
Note that in addition to the resilience measure considered 
30 
in this work, there exists other performance metrics for net-
work resilience, e.g. two-terminal connectivity, and flexibil-
ity in route selection. Therefore, different performance met-
rics of network resilience are to be considered simultaneously 
when choosing a resilient network design. Overall, a chord 
network offers excellent resilience upon crosstalk attacks and 
good route selection flexibility. 
as a: --+ 0 and k > 2, 
as a: --+ 0 and k = 2, 
(33) 
TABLE I 
Bounds of Network Resilience Loss M 
by the route length and the nodal degree of the source node of 50 
the attack. If the network vulnerability is high, M.r,d is deter-
mined by the total number of network links incidental on 
nodes along the attacker's flow, e.g., the number oflinks in set 
bounds 
a Upper bound of Mhd 
k 




2k- 0(1- a) 
E.r,d={ e,/Y,EV.r,J In addition, 55 
a~o k+2d1-l+O(a) k+l+O(a) 
k 
60 TABLE II 
IE1,dl = 2=d; + (1-k). 
i=l Asymptotic Properties of Different Network Topologies with m Nodes 
Ave. nodal Ave. route Ave. size of 
Topology degree length Ef,d 
65 Star 2 ill 
The lower- and upper-bounds in (31) can be used to study Ring 2 m/4 m/4 
the impact of physical topology on M.r,d· For clarity, the 
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TABLE II-continued 
Asymptotic Properties of Different Network Topologies with m Nodes 
Ave. nodal Ave. route Ave. size of 
Topology degree length Ef,d 
n-ary Tree ill+l O(lognill) O(loJ"--ill) 
Mesh-Torus 4 ocvmJ 0( ill) 
Fully-Connected ill 1 ill 
Mesh 
Chord [23] log2 ill O(log2 ill) O(log2 ill) 
Having described the resilience in the context of the physi-
cal model, attention is directed now to the impact of the 
network layer on the resilience in terms of network load, and 
10 
in particular, quantifying how the network resilience varies 15 
jointly with the load, and the physical-layer vulnerability a. 
Network resilience is determined in one embodiment by the 
following equations (34) and (35). Consider the impact of 
network load p on M;;d· From (1), 
(34) 
where E;; [S,] is the mean number of channels affected by the 







is the mean number of active flows that enter node V, through 
linkji, given that the attack starts from flow fsd· Parameter a 
corresponds to the physical layer vulnerability to the distur-
bance, and denotes the conditional probability that the attack 
may propagate to the next downstream node on the attacker's 
route given that the current node is affected by the attack. 
Referring now to the different network topologies, con-
sider Point 1: For a ring network, assume the route set R 
consists of the two-link disjoint routes between each pair of 
nodes in the network. Let k be the number of nodes traversed 
by the attacker's flow fsd· Then, M;;d monotonically increases 
in p. In particular, M;;d satisfies the following: 
k 
where v1 = k + 2 .L ai-l _ 
i=l 
(36) 
Furthermore, for O<p<<l, p=y+o(p ), and the upper and the 
lower bounds meet 
(37) 
Detailed proof of Point 1 with regard to ring networks can 
be explained as follows. Consider a ring network G(V,E) with 
35 m nodes (m> 1 ). The route set R consists of the two link-
disjoint routes between each pair of nodes in the network. 
Suppose the crosstalk attack is started on flow fif between 
node V,andV1, i,j=l, 2, ... , m, i<j. The set of nodes traversed 
s the mean number of active channels that are locally inserted 40 
into the network at node V, and leave node V, through link ij, 
and 
by flow fif is Vii ={V,, V,+1 , ... , VJ. Then at most two nodes, 
node v,_l anddode vj+l' are neighbors of nodes in vf;, but are 
not in Vii themselves. Without loss of generality, ond focus is 
on the c~nditional wavelength usage at the link between V1 
andV1+i· 
To show that Mf; monotonically increases in p for the ring 
45 network, from (35), it suffices to show that 
is the mean number of active flows that enter node V, through 
linkji, given that the attack starts from flow fsd· The network 50 
resilience loss M;; does not always increase with p for arbi-
trary networks wiffi arbitrary routes. However, when practical 
route sets are considered, M;; increases with p for several 
typical network topologies. ,J 
Explaining equations (34) and (35) further, equation (34) 
characterizes the expected number of affected channels in the 55 
network given that the attack started from flow fsd· E;; [S,] is 
the expected number of channels affected by the atfack at 
node i given that the attack is started on flow fsd· 
60 
is the mean number of active channels that are locally inserted 65 
into the network at node V, and that leave node V, through link 
ij, and 
monotonically increase with parameter yin (24) for the ring 
network. Let 
Wu = .2= Nuv and Hu = .2= Nih· 
ruvERij TjhERij 
Then for the ring network, denote 
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E1u[ ~ N1h]asw11+1(m,fu,ring), 
rjhERj j+l 
where m is the number of nodes in the ring network. 
Let w12(I,bus) denote the mean value ofW12 in an I-node 
network of bus topology with a route set that includes the 
route between each pair of nodes, where subscript I denotes 







> 0, for I= 2. If I> 2, 
(44) 
awn(/, bus) 2ff-1 (8) + 8(ff-d1-2 - fi-df-2) 
a8 ((l+WJfi-1(8J-8fi-2(8JJ2 · 
f! fi-1 - fd!-1 = 2fl-1 - fi-d1-2 + 8(ff-d1-2 - fi-df-2). (45) 
Since f2 'f1 -f2 f1 '=28
2 +48+1 >O, through mathematical induc-
10 
tion, from (45), the following is observed f)fI_ 1-flI-1'>0, 
'v'I>l, and 
it is sufficient to show thatw 12(1,bus), VI> 1, increases mono- 15 




> o, v 1>1. 
(46) 
Let 8=y/(1-y) and W=(W,/Y,-V). In addition, a configu-
ration of (N,W) with non-zero probability is denoted as a 
traffic pattern. Let sum(W) denote the summation of all the 
components in W, then from (24), 
(39) 
where 12 (A)=l if A is true; and 12 (A)=O, otherwise. If (N,W) 
is a traffic pattern, (39) can be simplified as 
Since 8=y/(1-y), and 0<8<1, it follows that 
20 
awn(/, bus) 
ay > 0, VI> 1. 
From Proposition 1, M;; monotonically increases in p for the 
25 ring network. " 
The upper and lower bound of M;;d in (36) is obtained by 
showing that 
(47) 
(40) 30 For an arbitrary network topology G(V,E), if ri/ER, i.e., 
there is one route from node V, to V1 in R, where V,EV;;d' 
V/f:-V;;d' and V,-Vi' then, 
Let T (l),bus denote the set of all traffic patterns on the bus 
network with I nodes (I> 1 ). By counting all possible ways of 
using linkA1A2 , the I-node bus network can be described as 
follows, 
P(W12 = 1) cc 
8 ~ e'um(W(l-1),bu,) + 82 ~ e'um(W(l-2),bu,) + ... + 81; 
T(/-1),bus T(l-2),bus 




fi(8) = ~ e'um(W(l),bu,), V / > 1, and fi(8) = 1. 
T(/),bus 
P(W12~1)cx8j[_ 1 (8)+82j[_2(8)+ ... +81,P(W12~0)cxj[_ 1 
(8). 
(41) 
Furthermore, the following recursive equations are observed, 
Ji (8J = 1; Ji(8J = 1+8; f;(8J = (1 + WJJ;-1 (8J - 8f;_2(8J, 
i = 3, 4, ... , I. 
Then, 
! 1: 8' w12(/, bus)= fi-i (8) 1 - -( 1_+_2_8-Jf-1--1 (-8-J --8 f;-1--2-(8) ' 
if I= 2, 
if I> 2. 
(42) 
(43) 
E_r,d[W y]"':y, (48) 
35 
Hence, the ring network considered here satisfies the condi-
tion in ( 48). 
Let E1 be the set oflinks that are not traversed by flow fsd: 
E1={ei/:V,-V1, rsfi:Ri/}. Let R1 be the set of routes in R that 
only traverse links in E1 . Let E2 =E1\{ e;;}, and R2 be the set of 40 J 
routes in R that only traverse links in E2 . Hence, R2 c R1 c R, 
ifri/ER. 
Let T Ei ={ (N Ei' WE)} be the set of traffic patterns restricted 
to a network formed by link set E1 with route set R1 . Let 
45 
TE,={ (NE,, WE,)} be the set of traffic patterns restricted to a 




8Z1 (8) + Z2(8) 
Ef,d [Wu] = (1+8)Z1 (8) + Z2(8) 
where 
Z2(8) = ~ e'um(WE1) - (1+8)Z1 (8). 
TE! 
(49) 
In addition, Z2 (8)>0 ifthere is a route that traverses link ij and 
one or more links in set E2 ; Z2 (8)=0, otherwise. 
Since Z1(8)>0, the following is observed 
(50) 
To show that w1 J+ 1 (m,fi/,ring)~p, from (38), it suffices to 65 show that 
wu(m-j+l,bus):"'p, (51) 
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which can be proved through the following two lemmas. 
wu(I,bus):"'wu(I+l,bus), 'efl>l. Lemma 1: 
wu(m,bus):"'p, 'efm>l. Lemma2: 
Lemma 1 and 2 are proved using induction similarly as in the 
proofof ( 46). Detailed proof is omitted here. Using ( 47), (36) 
can be obtained from (35). 
Point 2: For a star network, assume that the route set R 
consists of the routes between each pair of nodes in the 10 
network. Let m, m> 1, be the number of nodes in the network. 
Let the hub node be denoted as V m· Then, M;;d monotonically 
increases in p. In particular, M;;d satisfies 
15 
1
3+a:+(m-2)a:y, if hd =fA;Am• i= 1, ... ,m-1, 
Mf,d?. 3+a:+(m-2)y, iff;d=fAmA;•i=l, ... ,m-1, 






P(Hm; = llR1=fimlcc8 ~ 
T(m-1),star 
P(Hm; = OIR1 = fiml cc 
~ e'um(W;m-1).Mar) + (m _ 2)82 ~ 
Let 
T(m-1),star T(m-2),star 








3+a:+2(m-2)a:p, if f,d=fA;Am,i=l, ... ,m-1, 
Mi,ds 3+a:+2(m-2)p, iff,d=fAmA;,i=l, ... ,m-1, 
(53) 20 Then, the following recursive equations are observed, 
t2~l+8; t1~(1+8)t1_ 1 +(I-2)82tk_2, 'efl>2. 
4 +a:+ a:2 + 2(m - 3)a:p, otherwise. 
Furthermore, for O<p<<l, the bounds are tight, and 25 
(54) 
1
3+a:+2(m-2)a:p+o(p), if f,d =fA;Am' i= 1, ... ,m-1, 
3+a:+2(m-2)p+o(p), if f,d =fAmA;• i= 1, ... ,m-1, 
4 +a:+ a:2 + 2(m - 3)a:p + o(p), otherwise, 
30 
Proofs of Point 2 with regard to star networks can be 35 
explained as follows. For a network of star topology with m 
nodes, m>2, and a route set R that consists of the routes 
between each pair of nodes. Let node V m be the hub node of 
the star network. Let 
40 
Wu = ~ Nuv and Hu = ~ Nih· 
ruvERij TjhERij 
Therefore, from (55)-(58), 
(59) 
(8- lJtm-l 
l + (1 + 8)tm-! + (m - 2)82tm-2. 
Through induction similarly as in the proof of ( 46), 




, it can be 
shown that 
When the attack is started on flow f1m, wm,(m,f1m, 
star)+lil m,(m,f1m,star), i=2, ... , m-1, increases monotoni-
cally with y, where 
45 Thus, from (35), it follows that Mfifmonotonically increases 
in p for the star network. The upper and lower bound of M;;d 
in (52) and (53) is obtained by showing that 
Wm;(m, f1m, star)= Elim [ ~ N"']' 
ruvERmi 
and 
Wm;(m, fim, star)= Elim [ ~ Nmh]· 
rmhERmi 
Let T(J),star denote the set of all traffic patterns on the star 
network with I nodes. By counting all possible ways of using 
link mi, it can be found that, for the I-node star network, 
P(Wm; = llR1 = fim) cc (55) 











Equation (60) can be obtained by showing 
y:"'wm;(mf1m,star):"'p, 
y:"'wm;(mJ12,star):"'p. (62) 
The proof of (62) is similar to that of ( 47), and is omitted. 
Referring to point 2, M;;d generally is the sum of two terms: 
e.g. in (62) below, (3+a) that corresponds to the number of 
affected channels used by flows on the attacker's route; and 
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(2(m-2)ap+o(p )) that corresponds to the number of affected 
channels used by flows not on the attacker's route. 
M;;d is compared for ring and star networks. In both cases, 
M;; is linearly increasing in p for O<p<<l. However, for ring 
net~orks, Mr is polynomially increasing in a; whereas for 5 
hd 
star networks, M;;d is linearly increasing in a. For ring net-
works, M;;d is linearly increasing ink (the number of nodes in 
V;;J For star networks, M;;d is linearly increasing in m (the 
number of nodes in the network). 10 
In the description that follows, a focus is placed on the 
impact of network load p on the average network resilience 
loss (M), which is the mean value of network resilience loss 
over all possible source of attacks. Consider a ring network 
with m, m> 1, nodes, V 1'V 2, ... , V m' and a route set R that 15 
includes all the two link-disjoint paths between each pair of 










Using Point 1, the following bounds are observed: 
(69) 
Mring.m S (m ~ l) f {a;(i + 1+~a:i+2(1 + d)p)}· 
i=l J-
(70) 
The difference between the upper and the lower bound of 






/ (m -1) + o(p), asp--+ 0. (71) 
m-1 l (72) 
Mringm ='\'--:-MIA A j(m-l),as p---7 l,m---7co. , L..J 21 1 i+l 
i=l 
Then, the following can be described: 
M,;ng,m ~p(3+a)/(m-1 )+o(p ), as p~o, (73) 
which shows that, when the network load is low, Mring,m 
increases almost linearly with p and a; and is in the order of 
O(p/m). 
where a,=P(N1,+1 =1) is the probability that a connection with 
i links between two terminal nodes, V 1 and V,+1, is active, and 
Mfi;,1 is the network resilience loss when the attack is started 
from flow f1,+1. 
When the network load is high, the following can be 
30 
described: 
Furthermore, the following can be presented: 
Gj = ri fm-i+l I gm, 
8=y/(l-y), 
,/1 +482 + 1(1 +28+ ,/1 +482 )m-I 
fm = + 
2,/1+482 2 
v'T+4e2 - 1 ( 1 + 28 - v'T+4e2 )m- I 
2,/1 +482 2 , 
m-1 






Detailed proof of Point 3 can be explained as follows. First, 
a,=P(N1,+1=l) is described. Through solving the difference 
equation in (42), (66) can be proved. 
Let T (1),ring be the set ofall traffic patterns on a ring network 
with I nodes and a route set that includes all possible link-
disjoint shortest paths between each pair of nodes in the 
network. Let 
By counting different ways of using one single link in the ring 






=l)=8'fk-i+/gk. Using the lower and 
upper bound ofM;;Jorthe ring network in (36), 3 is obtained. 
Mring,m = (74) 
m~ 1{f ~(i+l + ta:i +2(1 +a:')}, asp--+ l,m--+ co. 
i=l J 0 
35 
Furthermore, if a=l, (74) can be simplified as follows: 
40 
1 ( 2m+8) 
Mring,m = m- l 10 - 2m-1 ' 
(75) 
45 which shows that Mring,m is in the order ofO(l/m). 
Next consider a starnetworkwithmnodes, V1,V2, ... , V m' 
where V mis the hub node of the star network; and a route set 
R that includes all the link-disjoint paths between each pair of 
nodes in the network. It follows that, 
50 Point 4: 
55 
60 
where b1=P(NA1Ak=l), b2=P(NA1A2=l) with 
b1~8tm_/tm; b2~82tm-2/tm; /1~1; /2~1+8; t;~ 
(1+8)1;_1+(i-2)821;_2, 'efi>2. 
Detailed proof of Point 4 can be explained as follows. From 
(55)-(58), 
P(N1m~1)~8tk_/tk; P(NA1A2~1)~e21m-2ltm; 'efk>3. 
Using the lower and upper bound ofM;;d for the star network 
65 in (52) and (53), Point 4 can be obtained. 
Furthermore, using Point 2, the following bounds for 
Mstar,m are observed 





(m _ l) {b1 (4 + (1 + a:)(2 + (m - 2)y)) + 
(77) 




(m _ l) {b1 (4 + 2(1 + a:)(l + (m - 2)p)) + 
(78) 




W =(Wu, i- j). 
Since E [sum(N)IW]~E [sum(W)IW], 
E(sum(N)):"'E(sum(W)). (83) 
The difference between the upper and the lower bound of 10 
Mstar,m is 0( a(2p-y)) when mis large, since b2 is 0(1/m). In 
addition, when the network load is low, 
As E [sum(W)]=plEI, from (83), 
E(sum(N)):"'plEI. 
It follows that 
M,,a,,m~p(3+a)!m+o(p), as p~O, (79) 15 
which shows that Mstar,m is O(p/m); and increases linearly 
with a. 
When the network load is high (p-1 ), the following can be 
presented: 
M,,a,,m~O(ap), as p-1, (80) 
which shows that, when the star network is under high load, 
Mstar,m increases linearly with a. 
For a general network G(V,E) with a fixed set of route R, 
the following upper bound for M can be described: 
Point 5: 
In (81), plEl/IRI corresponds to the upper bound of the 
probability that the crosstalk attack occurs in the network, and 
20 is accurate when the network route set R only consists of 
routes with link-length 1. The bound in (81) provides a worst 
case estimation ofM. 
Furthermore, suppose that all the routes in the set R are of 
the same link length I. Then the probability that a crosstalk 
25 attack happens in the network is (plEl)/(llRI), and (81) can be 
refined as follows: 
(84) 
(81) 30 
where IEI is the cardinality of the set of edges in the network; 
IRI is the cardinality of the route set R. The proof of point 5 
35 
can be explained as follows. Since 
When the length of each network route and the network 
resilience loss M;;d are the same for each possible source of 
attack, the equality in (84) holds. Point 5 suggests the upper 
bound of average network resilience loss is affected by the 
following factors: 
( 1) The network load in the network. The upper bound in 
(84) increases at least linearly with p. 
M = ~ M1,dP(N,d = l)/21RI, 
f,d (2) The number of links in the network. The larger the 
40 number oflinks in the network, the less resilient the network. 
the following is observed: 
(82) 45 
Let N=(Nsd:rsE=R), and E [] stands for expectation. Since 50 
each connection consists of two flows, then 
~ P(N,d = 1) = 2sum(N). 
f,d 
Thus, to prove Point 5, it suffices to show that 
E(sum(N)):"'plEI. 
The following is observed: 




The upper bound in (84) increases linearly with the number of 
links in the network. 
(3) The number of routes in the network. The larger the 
number of routes in the network, the more resilient the net-
work. This is because the probability for a route to be chosen 
as the attacker's route is smaller. 
Next Equation (81) is used to study a mesh-torus network 
with m nodes and a route set R, which includes: (1) the unique 
link-shortest route between each pair of nodes if applicable; 
and (2) one shortest route between each pair of nodes, which 
forms the border of the sub-grid with the two nodes at the 
diagonally opposite comers. 
Point 6 can be expressed as follows: 
(85) 
Then, from (81), 
2mp 
Mtorus,m::; m(m- l)~x{Mfsd}, 
(86) 





M < (m-1) (1-a:) ' 
torus,m -
___}£___ 6 {";;; + 4, 
(m-1) 
if a:* 1, 
otherwise. 
Furthermore, when p--;.0, it can be found that 
34 
Hu= ~ N;h, Hu E {0, 1), 
TjhERij 
(2) 
which is the number of flows locally originated at node i and 
leave node V, through link ij. Then the factor graph represen-
tation can be transformed accordingly. On the other hand, it is 
M,0ru0,m~p(3+a)/(m-l)+o(p), as p~O. (87) 10 
possible to transform factor graphs with loops into loop-free 
factor graphs, so that exact results can be obtained using the 
sum-product algorithm, sometimes at the cost of computa-
A comparison of the average network resilience loss for 
ring, star and mesh networks is shown in Table III below. The 
following can be observed: 
(1) When the network load is low (O<p<<l ), Mis O(p/m). 
This is because when the load is close to zero (0), the network 
is most likely in either of two states: (a) there is no active 
connection in the network; or (b) there is an active connection 
oflink length 1. Specifically, with probability O(p ), the attack 
is started on a route oflink length 1; with probability o(p ), the 
attack is started on a route oflonger lengths. For instance, as 
each route is the attacker's route with equal probability, the 
attack starts on routes of link length 1 in the mesh-torus 
network with probability 2p/(m-1) and M;;d=(3+a)+o(p) if 
p<<l. 
(2) When the network load is high (p--;. l ), the star network 
is the least resilient, with M being 0( a). This is because, for 
the star network, nodes in the set VJ; , \frsE=R, has the most 
number of neighboring links. Ring a'~d mesh-torus networks 
show good network resilience in O(p/m). 
TABLE III 
Average Network Resilience Loss (M) 
M p~o p~l 
Ring network p(3 + a)/(m - 1) 0(1/m) 
Star network p(3 + a)/m O(a) 
Mesh-torus 2p(3 + a)/(m - 1) {0(1/(1-a:)m), if a:* 1, 
0(1/&), otherwise. 
For networks with irregular topologies, the sum-product 
algorithm on the factor graph is used. The sum-product algo-
rithm is then compared with the exact resilience calculation 
through enumerations of all network traffic patterns. Enu-
meration has the computational complexity exponential in 
the number of routes, and is thus not applicable to networks 
with even a medium number of routes. The computational 
complexity of the sum-product algorithm is exponential in the 
maximum nodal degree of the factor graph for the worst case, 
and is thus much more efficient than enumeration. The sum-
product algorithm provides exact results when the factor 
graph has no loops, and provides approximate results other-
wise. 
When there are a large number routes in the set R, to further 
reduce the computational complexity of the sum-product 
algorithm, the following intermediate variables can be intro-
duced: 
Wu = ~ N0 " Wu E {0, 1), (1) 
ruvERij 
which is the number of flows that enter the switching plane of 
node V, through link ij; 
tional complexity. 
Consider the three networks shown in FIG. SA-SC. Shown 
is a ring network S02, double-ring network S04, and a mesh 
15 network S06. In each network, consider that the route set has 
21 routes, which corresponds to one link-shortest route 
between each pair of nodes. Using the sum-product algo-
rithm, network resilience loss is computed given the source of 
20 
attack M;;d for each fsd· Then, the sum-product algorithm is 
used to find the probability of P(Nsd=l ). Finally, (2) is used to 
compute the average network resilience loss. 
FIG. 9 provides a graph 900 that depicts the relationship 
between p and average network resilience loss M for the 
25 networks S02 (ring), S04 (double ring), and S06 (mesh) in 
SA-SC, respectively, with a=0.6. It can be observed that: 
30 
(1) M monotonically increases with p, in networks with 
all-to-all traffic and link-shortest path routing. Moreover, for 
low loads, M increases linearly with p. 
(2) The sum-product algorithm results in an almost exact M 
for the mesh and ring networks, even though the factor graph 
representations contain loops. The performance of sum-prod-
uct algorithm is not as accurate, yet acceptable for the double-
ring network. This suggests that the sum-product algorithm 
35 can be used for large networks where exact calculation of 
resilience is infeasible. 
The sum-product algorithm can be used to study the net-
work resilience for the well-known benchmark National Sci-
ence Foundation Network (NSF) network topology with 14 
40 nodes and 21 bi-directional links. Assume that there is one 
link-shortest route between each pair of nodes in the net-
works. Then, there are 91 routes in R. The corresponding 
factor graph representation contains loops, and thus the sum-
product algorithm provides an approximation for M. FIG. 10 
45 shows a graph 1000 that reflects the relationship between p 
and M for the NSF network topology with a=0.3, 0.6, 0.9. 
The graph 1000 in FIG. 10 suggests that, ifthe set of network 
routes consists of one link-shortest route between each pair of 
nodes in the network, M generally increases with the network 
50 load. Furthermore, when the network load is low, M increases 
linearly with p. 
As described above, several factors from both the physical-
and the network layer that affect the resilience have been 
explored. Factors from the physical-layer include: (1) the 
55 physical-layer vulnerability, parameters in Bayesian Belief 
Network that characterize how likely the attack propagates, 
and (2) the physical topology. Factors from the network layer 
include active network connections that are characterized 
using network load, e.g., the probability that the wavelength, 
60 on which the attack is initiated, is used in the network. For all 
the topologies disclosed herein, it has been demonstrated that 
the average network resilience loss increases linearly with 
respect to the physical-layer vulnerability and light network 
load under link-shortest routing, and all-to-all traffic. In addi-
65 tion, ring and mesh-torus network show good resilience, 
which are inversely proportional to the numberof the nodes in 
the network. Numerical results also suggest that for networks 
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with link-shortest routing and all-to-all traffic, the network 
resilience loss increases at least linearly with respect to the 
network load. 
There are several benefits resulting from the cross-layer 
model based on graphical models. For instance, the cross-
layer model provides an explicit representation of the depen-
dencies and interactions between the physical- and the net-
work layer. In addition, the cross-layer model facilitates the 
analytical investigation of network resilience for ring, star, 
and special cases of mesh topologies. Further, the cross-layer 10 
model facilitates the implementation of computationally effi-
cient approaches, e.g. the sum-product algorithm, for evalu-
ating network resilience. Compared to previous work by the 
inventors reflected by the March 2005 publication, "Probabi-
15 
listic Graphical Models for Resilience of All-Optical Net-
works under Crosstalk Attacks," the determination of resil-
ience as described herein is more meaningful. For instance, in 
the various embodiments described herein, resilience is mea-
sured based on the number of affected wavelength charmels at 20 
each node. Hence, the measurements reveal not only whether 
a network node is affected by an attack or not, but also 
quantifies how many wavelength charmels are affected at a 
particular node. In other words, the measure of resilience as 
herein described characterizes the level of damage to each 25 
affected node. This quantifying measure is revealed in FIG. 7, 
where the variable S at the middle of the factor graph 700 
combines both the status of each route (network layer model) 
and the status of each node (physical layer model). In con-
trast, the March 2005 publication discloses a method that 30 
measures the resilience based on the percentage of nodes 
affected in the network, which does not provide such quanti-
fying measures or characterization of node damage. 
36 
At least the following is claimed: 
1. A computer-implemented method for optical network 
evaluation, comprising: 
for a physical model, modeling propagation of a distur-
bance in an optical network under static network condi-
tions based on the disturbance propagation having a 
threshold effect only on nodes along a route followed by 
the disturbance, the modeling implemented by a com-
puter; 
for a network model, modeling a status of each network 
route in the optical network based on the disturbance, the 
modeling implemented by the computer; and 
combining the physical layer model and the network layer 
model to provide a cross layer model that characterizes 
the disturbance propagation based on network layer and 
physical layer dependencies and interactions in the opti-
cal network, the combining implemented by the com-
puter, wherein modeling the status comprises determin-
ing a probability distribution of active connections in the 
optical network and the number of affected wavelength 
channels, the modeling implemented by the computer; 
wherein all active wavelength channels in the switching 
plane of node V, are affected if node V, is affected by the 
disturbance, wherein 
corresponds to the total number of active wavelength chan-
nels in the switching plane of node V,, 
corresponds to the number of flows that enter the switching 
40 plane of node V, through link ij, and 
In view of the above description, it should be appreciated 
that one method embodiment 200a, as shown in FIG. 11, 35 
comprises for a physical model, modeling propagation of a 
disturbance in an optical network under static network con-
ditions based on the disturbance propagation having a thresh-
old effect only on nodes along a route followed by the distur-
bance (1102), for a network model, modeling a status of each 
network route in the optical network based on the disturbance 
(1104), and combining the physical layer model and the net-
work layer model to provide a cross layer model that charac-
terizes the disturbance propagation based on network layer 
and physical layer dependencies and interactions in the opti- 45 
cal network (1106). 
Any process descriptions or blocks in flow charts should be 
understood as representing modules, segments, or portions of 
code which include one or more executable instructions for 
implementing specific logical functions or steps in the pro- 50 
cess, and alternate implementations are included within the 
scope of the preferred embodiments of the present disclosure 
in which functions may be executed out of order from that 
shown or discussed, including substantially concurrently or 
in reverse order, depending on the functionality involved, as 55 
would be understood by those reasonably skilled in the art of 
the present disclosure. 
It should be emphasized that the above-described embodi-
ments of the present disclosure are merely possible examples 
ofimplementations, merely set forth for a clear understanding 60 
of the principles of the disclosure. Many variations and modi-
fications may be made to the above-described embodiment(s) 
of the disclosure without departing substantially from the 
spirit and principles of the disclosure. All such modifications 
and variations are intended to be included herein within the 65 
scope of this disclosure and the present disclosure and pro-
tected by the following claims. 
corresponds to the number of flows that are locally originated 
from node V, and enter the network through link ij. 
2. The method of claim 1, further comprising determining 
resilience of the optical network based on the cross layer 
model, the determining implemented by the computer. 
3. The method of claim 1, wherein the physical model is 
represented by a directed graph. 
4. The method of claim 1, wherein the network model is 
represented by an undirected probabilistic graph. 
5. The method of claim 1, further comprising displaying 
the cross layer model as a factor graph representation. 
6. The method of claim 1, wherein the disturbance com-
prises crosstalk. 
7. The method of claim 1, wherein the optical network is an 
all optical network. 
8. The method of claim 1, wherein the physical layer model 
comprises the following equation: 
US 7,903,970 B2 
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-continued 
k-1 k n P(X;+1IX;, Rf= hd)n P(S;IX;, N =n, Rf= f,d), 
i=l 1=1 
where S;;d=(S,:V1EV;;), and X;;d=(X,:V,EV;;) k is the 
number of nodes in V;;d' wherein the physical layer 
model includes the probability of the number of chan-
nels affected Sat each network node V given the statusX 10 
of network routes n and the source of attack Rfl where Rf 
denotes the unidirectional flow fsd where the attack 
originates. 
9. The method of claim 8, wherein the network layer model 
comprises the following equation: 15 
and ii ( ~ Nu,J = 0, otherwise.; 
ruvERij 






k-1 k n P(X;+1IX;, Rf= f,d)n P(S;IX;, N = n, Rf= f,d), 
i=l 1=1 
where S;;d=(S,:V,EV;;), andX;;d=(X,:V,EV;;), wherein the 
physical layer model includes the probability of the 
number of channels affected S at each network node V 
given the status X of network routes n and the source of 
attack Rfl where Rf denotes the unidirectional flow fsd 
where the attack originates; and 
determine resilience of the optical network based on the 
cross layer mode. 
12. The system of claim 11, wherein the executable instruc-
tions when implemented by the processor, provide the net-
work layer model of the optical network, the network layer 
model comprising the following equation: 
30 otherwise, wherein 
is the total number of active connections using wavelength 'A 
on link ij; y iJ comprises a weight of using wavelength A at link 
ij, wherein a potential function of a clique associated with link 
ij is yiJ if wavelength A is used at linkij; and 1-yiJ if wavelength 35 
A is not used at link ij, wherein ZN is a normalization constant. 
10. The method of claim 9, wherein the cross layer model 
comprises the following equation: 
is the total number of active connections using wavelength 'A 
on link ij; y iJ comprises a weight of using wavelength 'A at link 
ij, wherein a potential function of a clique associated with link 
P(Xhd'Sh.JNIR1=J,d)~P(SMXhdlN,R1~J,d)P(NIR1~J,d), 
where X;;d=(X,:V,EV;;) and S;;d=(S,:V,EV;;), P(S;;d,X;;)N, 
Rf=fsd) corresponds to the physical layer model, which char-
acterizes the probability distribution of the status and the 
number of affected channels at each node on the attacker's 
route given the status of each route and the source of attack, 
P(NIRf=fsd) corresponds to the network layer model, which 
characterizes the probability distribution of the status of each 
network route given the source of attack. 
40 ij isyiJifwavelength'Ais usedatlinkij; and 1-yiJifwavelength 
A is not used at link ij, wherein ZN is a normalization constant. 
13. The system of claim 12, wherein the executable instruc-
tions, when implemented by the processor, provide a cross-
layer model, wherein the cross layer model comprises the 
45 following equation: 
P(Xh.JSh.JNIR_rf,d)~P(Sh.JJY,dlN,R_rf,d)P(NIR_rf,d), 
where X;;d=(X,:V,EV;;) and S;;d=(S,:V,EV;;), P(S;;d,X;;)N, 
Rf=fsd) corresponds to the physical layer model, which char-
11. A system, comprising: 
a processor; and 
memory including executable instructions that, when 
implemented by the processor: 
provide a cross layer model of disturbance propagation 
50 acterizes the probability distribution of the status and the 
number of affected channels at each node on the attacker's 
route given the status of each route and the source of attack, 
P(NIRf=fsd) corresponds to the network layer model, which 
of a disturbance in an optical network by combining a 
physical layer model of the optical network and a 
55 
network layer model of the optical network, the physi-
cal layer model based on the disturbance propagation 
having a threshold effect only on nodes along a route 
followed by the disturbance; 
provide the physical layer model of the optical network, 
60 
wherein the physical layer model comprises the follow-
ing equation: 
65 
characterizes the probability distribution of the status of each 
network route given the source of attack. 
14. The system of claim 11, wherein the resilience of the 
optical network includes an upper bound and a lower bound. 
15. The system of claim 11, wherein the executable instruc-
tions, when implemented by the processor, represent the cross 
layer model graphically as a factor graph representation. 
16. The system of claim 11, wherein the disturbance com-
prises crosstalk. 
17. The system of claim 11, wherein the optical network is 
an all optical network. 
18. A non-transitory, tangible computer readable medium 
having a program stored thereon for execution by an instruc-
tion execution system to model network layer and physical 
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layer interactions and dependencies in an optical network, the 
program for performing the steps of: 
for a physical layer model, modeling propagation of a 
disturbance in an optical network under static network 
conditions based on the disturbance propagation having 
a threshold effect only on nodes along a route followed 
by the disturbance, where the physical layer model com-
prises the following equation: 
k-1 k 
10 
n P(X;+1 IX;, R1 = f,d)n P(S; IX;, N = n, R1 = f;d), 
i=l 1=1 15 
where S;;d=(S,:V,EV;;), andX;;d=(X,:V,EV;;), wherein the 
physical layer model includes the probability of the 
number of channels affected S at each network node V 20 
given the status X of network routes n and the source of 
attack Rfl where Rf denotes the unidirectional flow fsd 
where the attack originates; 
for a network layer model, modeling a status of each net-
25 
work route in the optical network based on the distur-
bance; and 
combining the physical layer model and the network layer 
model to provide a cross layer model that characterizes 
the disturbance propagation based on network layer and 30 
physical layer dependencies and interactions in the opti-
cal network. 
19. The non-transitory, tangible computer readable 
medium of claim 18, wherein the network layer model com-




is the total number of active connections using wavelength A 
on link ij; y iJ comprises a weight of using wavelength A at link 
ij, wherein a potential function of a clique associated with link 
ij is y iJ if wavelength A is used at link ij; and 1-y iJ if wavelength 
A is not used at link ij, wherein ZN is a normalization constant; 
and 
the cross layer model comprises the following equation: 
P(Xhd'Shd'NIR_rf,d)~P(Shd'JY,dlN,R_rf,d)P(NIR_rf,d), 
where X;;d=(X,:V,EV;;) and S;;d=(S,:V,EV;;), P(S;;d,X;;)N, 
Rf=fsd) corresponds to the physical layer model, which char-
acterizes the probability distribution of the status and the 
number of affected channels at each node on the attacker's 
route given the status of each route and the source of attack, 
P(NIRf=fsd) corresponds to the network layer model, which 
characterizes the probability distribution of the status of each 
network route given the source of attack. 
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